Italy and Germany have signed a non-binding agreement on enhanced cooperation on security, defence and resilience. The agreement lays new foundations for regular engagements between the countries’ foreign and defence ministries at a time of significant political alignment between the two capitals. The document features a very prominent section on defence industrial cooperation, with the two governments looking to “ reinforce the long-lasting and trustful industrial cooperation on defence projects” and, where possible, “explore industrial collaboration and common procurement”. The agreement is highly symbolic in an of itself, yet it gains further meaning when cast against a backdrop of struggling cooperation between Germany and France, with the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) programme and the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) for a next generation main battle tank facing significant disagreements and delays.

For more:

Full text of the Agreement — governo.it

Italy and Germany double down on competitiveness and defense at Rome summit — Decode 39

Is there room for Germany in GCAP?

As FCAS seems destined to implode — at least in its current configuration — due to continuing friction between France and Germany and their industries, the 23 January summit between Chancellor Merz and Prime Minister Meloni served as an opportunity to discuss defence cooperation. Reportedly, Germany used the occasion to probe Italy’s position on a German entry into the rival GCAP programme.

Ultimately, German probing into GCAP may be a sign of the impracticability of FCAS due to diverging requirements and industrial frictions. However, a more cynical reading may also interpret it merely as a negotiation tactic in order to pressure France and call its bluff on the possibility of working on FCAS without Germany. Whatever the reason, the FCAS saga may not be over just yet.

Full analysis here:

European industry looks to competitive Southeast Asia market

As the epicentre of global strategic competition shifts inexorably toward the Indo-Pacific, Southeast Asian countries are looking to significantly bolster their military capabilities. Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines are working to modernise their militaries, resulting in growing defence budgets and imports. Between the late nineties and 2018, US, Russian, and aggregate EU arms sales to the region were roughly comparable in terms of value. Yet the US and EU states provided more advanced weaponry, whereas Russia was typically more competitive in the realm of cheap weapon systems.

Southeast Asian arms imports actually fell between 2015 and 2024, though growing tensions with China, as well as competition between China and the US, countries in the region are enacting or planning spending increases in the near future. This has historically been a highly competitive market for potential exporters, but there are still substantial opportunities in defence for the European defence industry. In fact, on paper, European exports may benefit from some regional players’ reluctance to ostensibly side with either Beijing or Washington by acquiring too much advanced weaponry from one or the other.

Recent developments point to a strong effort by EU countries outside well-established suppliers such as France and Germany. Italy and its main shipbuilder, Fincantieri, have been selling warships to Indonesia, whereas Italian defence giant Leonardo has signed a Letter of Intent with Jakarta for the sale of 24 M-346 light fighters. Last summer, Sweden’s Saab secured a contract with Thailand for the sale of four Gripen E/F fighters, with Bangkok’s air force already operating twelve Gripen of the D and C variants.

For more:

Asia boosts weapons buys, military research as security outlook darkens — Reuters

Arms in Asia: the EU, Weapons Exports and South-East Asia — VUB Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy

As FCAS seems destined to implode — at least in its current configuration — due to continuing friction between France and Germany and their industries, the 23 January summit between Chancellor Merz and Prime Minister Meloni served as an opportunity to discuss defence cooperation. Reportedly, Germany used the occasion to probe Italy’s position on a German entry into the rival GCAP programme.

While it is difficult to gauge the feasibility of a German entry into GCAP from the outside given that London, Rome, and Tokyo have already agreed on workshare arrangements, it is possible to at least discuss some of the pros and cons of such a development. Firstly, and most importantly from a GCAP perspective, a German role would alleviate one of the main obstacles to the programme’s success: financial costs. Indeed, Italy estimates a total spend of over 18 billion euro for its share, but even multiplying it by three may not be enough to take GCAP to the finish line. Germany’s coffers, bursting with post-Zeitenwende funding, would by all accounts offer much-needed relief. Indeed, GCAP has already been linked to Australia and Saudi Arabia as a way to make it more financially sustainable for the original partners, though for now nothing has been formalised.

Were Germany to join GCAP, we would witness a return to traditional combat aircraft cooperation in Europe, with the UK, Italy, and Germany joining forces again after Tornado and Eurofighter, with France happily undertaking a separate path. Eurofighter is very much an active programme thanks to maintenance and substantial updates, meaning that cooperation between London, Berlin, and Rome in this field has never really ended despite Germany’s somewhat surprising choice to opt for FCAS, and therefore difficult cooperation with France.

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Yet one a major hurdle stands in the way. Industrial cooperation in defence is as ever a difficult balancing act where countries coalesce in order to (hopefully) decrease costs for individual nations while increasing economy of scale and pooling knowledge to achieve state of the art systems and platforms. It is also a way for individual countries and their industries to gain a substantial boost and greatly benefit in terms of technological know-how. This means that there is an ideal point somewhere between:

• a scenario where a cooperative programme with few partners who may struggle to fund its development, but who have much to gain in terms of know-how, workshare, and intellectual property, and

• another scenario where there are too many partners and relatively little to gain by each one.

Programmes that err toward the latter may find it easier to raise the required funding, but also risk being weighed down by conflict around the many industrial interests and ideal requirements by end users, making cooperation more difficult as a result.

Leaving workshare issues aside, in the GCAP context, the UK, Italy, and Japan will likely have to evaluate whether the money Germany could bring to the table is game-changing enough to make everyone accept a smaller slice of the programme’s cake. While on the surface GCAP has been much smoother sailing than its counterpart, there has been some friction regarding the UK’s reluctance to share of technology with its two partners — according to Italian Defence Minister Crosetto. Defence industrial cooperation programmes are never easy or smooth.

To complicate things further, Breaking Defence has reported on 15 February that an industry source revealed a restructured FCAS, where partners focus on common technologies rather than the finished product, is still feasible. In this scenario, Germany and Spain would continue developing one aircraft, while France would work on their own — both based on shared technologies. Nevertheless, precedents in FCAS and other programmes that initially involved France (Tornado, Eurofighter) suggest that this alternative path may not necessarily make cooperation much easier. The type of technologies that make 6th generation programmes such as FCAS and GCAP prime candidates for cooperation are exactly the ones that give rise to the most bitter fights when negotiating workshare, leadership, exports, and ownership. As it stands, there is little to suggest that France and Dassault will take on a more accommodating approach on the most crucial and rewarding technologies.

Ultimately, German probing into GCAP may be a sign of the impracticability of FCAS. However, a more cynical reading may also interpret it merely as a negotiation tactic in order to pressure France and call its bluff on the possibility of working on FCAS without Germany. Whatever the reason, the FCAS saga may not be over just yet.

The Greenland saga continues

US President Donald Trump’s statements about Greenland’s ownership continue to erode NATO’s unity and raise questions over Europe’s ability to deal with his inflammatory rhetoric and aggressive posturing. Trump may have discounted the use of force to take over the island on Wednesday at Davos and announced a “framework deal” to settle the issue, but his social media threats of sanctions against European countries opposing US plans to acquire Greenland were almost as terrifying as the prospect of a hostile takeover. The White House’s coercive approach to dealing with Europe on this and other issues may bring Washington short-term gains, but it is already eroding the trust and commonality of interests that have made NATO an exceptionally long-lived alliance. Other than retaliatory tariffs, the EU has few cards at its disposal against Trump’s aggressive and unpredictable manoeuvring, and the UK even fewer. Some sort of enhanced military presence in Greenland — beyond a token force and preferably under a NATO umbrella — to demonstrate commitment to the island’s defence is among those cards, though it presents a set of significant challenges, as I wrote last week. Crucially, it does not address the exploitation of Greenland’s strategic natural resources and will not be enough, alone, to satisfy the White House’s demands.

For more:

Italy’s new GCAP price tag expectations

The Italian MoD has revealed that, while the country has already spent 2 billion euro on the GCAP programme for a sixth generation air combat system, a total of 18.6 billion is expected to be spent on the Italian contribution to its development, as reported by Tom Kington. The initial estimate of 6 billion euro, approved by parliament in 2021, was always considered to be insufficient for a programme of this magnitude, and the newest numbers are undoubtedly much more realistic. Yet GCAP is so unprecedented — in terms of both scope and development approach — for the participating countries (UK, Italy, and Japan) that accurate cost estimates may be more even challenging than in the past. Given the cost of previous combat aircraft programmes such as the Eurofighter and the rapidly evolving threat environment, further cost increases are more than likely. These numbers also reveal the full scale of the challenge ahead for GCAP and its struggling European rival FCAS.

For more:

Italy faces GCAP warplane price tag topping $21 billion - DefenseNews

The Global Combat Air Programme is Writing Cheques that Defence Can’t Cash - RUSI

A trailblazing UK programme for Ukraine’s ballistic missiles

Among the many fields in which European NATO allies are totally dependent on the US defence industry, ballistic missiles are one of the most glaring — as exposed by the war in Ukraine. Deep strike capabilities (DSC) have been crucial to Ukraine’s four-year defensive effort, even though they have been limited in number and scope due to Western-imposed red lines on how deep these weapons could strike Russian targets. US-supplied ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) have been particularly useful as a means to hit Russian high value targets behind the front line, posing a serious threat to supply lines, logistics hubs, ammunition depots, and refineries. These missiles are not only valuable in that they can hit such targets, but also because they can force the enemy to move such assets and hubs farther from the front line, and thus extend and further expose supply lines. Yet European countries currently have no autochthonous options for ballistic missiles and guided rockets, for which they depend on US suppliers, nor do they have ways to launch their existing cruise missiles from land-based platforms. As presented in 2023 by ECFR’s Rafael Loss and Angela Mehrer, Europeans cannot only focus on defensive capabilities as they attempt to bolster deterrence against Russia, but must also invest in offensive ground-launched deep strike capabilities — a field in which Moscow is far superior.

Against this backdrop, France is working on a new conventional medium range land-launched ballistic missile with a range of over 2.000km. Meanwhile, the UK has declared in January that it will develop new tactical ballistic missiles to support Ukraine’s war effort. The programme, named Project Nightfall and initially announced in 2025 (no mention of Ukraine then), aims to develop a system capable of deploying and launching quickly, with a production rate of 10 systems per month at a maximum price of 800.000 Pounds per missile. The programme is clearly highly ambitious, both in terms of the requirements and the development schedule. The UK MoD expects to award development contracts in March 2026, with the first test firings taking place 12 months later. Nevertheless, as Sidharth Kaushal (RUSI) explained to Politico.eu, Nightfall’s timeline presents significant challenges considering potential supply chain bottlenecks.

The UK MoD’s communication strategy, drawing a clear link between Nightfall and Ukraine, could be read as a way to further solidify the UK’s status as one of Ukraine’s most steadfast supporters. Nevertheless, this approach shows how support for Kyiv and urgent domestic defence requirements can go hand in hand, with the right approach. Indeed, taking Ukraine’s battlefield needs into account may maximise the scalability of the programme in terms of cost and production rates.

Other European partners should probably take note. While the UK’s approach here may not always be applicable to other pressing requirements, it may in some circumstances help fight the traditional tendency to ‘over-develop’ systems and make them too complex and costly for adequate economies of scale.

For more:

A French medium-range ballistic missile and ‘very high altitude’ ambitions - IISS

UK to develop new deep strike ballistic missile for Ukraine - UK Government

Striking absence: Europe’s missile gap and how to close it - ECFR

The UK’s big missile offer to Ukraine - Politico.eu

“I would like to make a deal, you know, the easy way. But if we don’t do it the easy way we’re going to do it the hard way”. (Donald Trump, 10 January 2026)

What the “hard way” is exactly remains rather unclear, even if a hostile takeover appears to be presented by Trump and some of his staff as the not-so-implicit alternative to a negotiated deal. While it may be tempting to see Tump’s maximalist and overtly aggressive approach to the issue as merely a negotiation tactic, some European leaders have taken it seriously enough that they have released a joint statement on 6 January, signalling their support for Denmark and arguing that Arctic security “must therefore be achieved collectively, in conjunction with NATO allies”. The statement, signed by the French President, the German Chancellor, and the Italian, Polish, Spanish, British, and Danish prime ministers, may be a remarkable sign of concern by some of Europe’s largest countries — but it cannot possibly scratch the surface of the trouble continued American Pressure on Denmark would spell for the cohesiveness of the NATO alliance and more broadly for US influence in Europe.

Greenland’s strategic importance

While the Arctic is becoming increasingly crowded as a result of strategic competition and climate change opening up new trade routes, Trump’s claims that waters around Greenland are infested with Chinese and Russian warships and submarines are heavily exaggerated according to other Western countries operating in the Arctic.

As has been amply reported, a 1951 treaty signed by Washington and Copenhagen already provides for a cooperation framework between the two allies with regard to the security and defence of Greenland. While some have said the treaty essentially gives the US a free hand in establishing new military bases and installations, this is inaccurate, as the 1951 treaty requires both parties to agree on the establishment of new ‘defence areas’. Thus, Denmark and indeed Greenland (which is now a party to the treaty on account of having been become an autonomous territory of the Kingdom of Denmark and having signed a 2004 agreement which amends and complements the previous one) both must agree to new defence installations — something they would have almost been guaranteed to do until now. Nevertheless, the treaty does not put formal limits to what military capabilities the US can station in agreed-upon defence areas, meaning that Washington is already legally allowed to robustly enhance Greenland’s defences in existing areas.

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However destabilising Trump’s words may be for transatlantic relations, and leaving aside the wealth of raw material and resources that the island offers, Greenland does in fact play an outsized role in US security. A map of the Arctic Ocean and the surrounding areas reveals how, from a US perspective, the Arctic represents the shortest route for ballistic missiles launched from Russia and China. For the same reason, the Arctic Ocean — even with its retreating ice sheets — is an ideal hiding place for ballistic missile submarines. Greenland is therefore a valuable platform from which to carry out early warning activities, along with northern Alaska and Canada. For this reason, the US Department of Defence has re-assigned Greenland to US Northern Command when it had previously been under US European Command.

The DoD’s Arctic Strategy from 2024, drafted during the Biden Administration, outlined a number of steps necessary to avoid that the Arctic become a “strategic blind spot”. Crucially, it highlighted the importance of working constructively with allies and partners as a necessary precondition for US security.

Yet the US has abandoned most of its bases in Greenland following the end of the Cold War. As of today, only Pituffik Space Base survives with less than 200 personnel stationed there. Pituffik is the US’ northernmost military installation and comprises an air base, docking facilities, and a substantial number of early warning radars contributing to North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). It also provides a strategic location from which to contact polar-orbit satellites multiple times a day. Interestingly, the regained importance of Greenland for US defence has not yet led to a commensurate increase in investment in the territory by Washington, with Pituffik itself still lacking adequate defences in the face of rising threats, according to some experts.

What’s more, the recent White House rhetoric regarding Greenland will clearly work against a partnership-focused approach to Arctic security, assuming that is still considered to be a desirable method.

A European-led NATO mission?

Washington’s European allies have but a few options as they try to present a united front against Trump’s push for Greenland. Other than strengthening their naval presence in the area, dispatching a small European force — as the UK and Germany are currently discussing — could serve two purposes. Firstly, it would show the US that Europeans are willing to act on the Trump Administration’s concerns with regard to Greenland being open to a Russian and Chinese takeover, and taking serious ownership in defending a vast, strategic territory that Denmark alone cannot hope to protect. Under a NATO umbrella, such a mission could be sold as a victory domestically by President Trump, who could claim to have forced the Europeans to step up in defending Greenland and bolstering US defences in North America. Secondly, the stable presence of a European-led NATO force in Greenland — however small — would make a hostile takeover even more unpalatable and unlikely than it should already be when only Danish troops are stationed there.

This scenario would entail a number of significant challenges. First of all, Greenland’s climate and geography are hugely inhospitable and sustaining a mission there would require a disproportionately large effort in terms of logistics (as the US’ own limited presence in Pituffik demonstrates). Secondly, European forces presently have little to spare in terms of air defence systems and other key capabilities that would provide sufficient protection to troops and assets deployed to Greenland if they are to be more than just a token force. As such, a mainly European, ad hoc NATO mission in Greenland would inevitably divert some precious resources from the European continent. Lastly, a military presence without a pragmatic and long-term plan on how to better defend Greenland from rising threats risks becoming a useless and costly exercise. Should NATO members agree that Greenland needs better defences, discussions should take place on whether new bases are needed in order to fill the security gaps left by the Americans after the Cold War. If no added value can be provided at a reasonable cost, then the Europeans may still end up having to deploy a NATO force simply to appease the current US Administration. While such an outcome may in the short term address President Trump’s security concerns, it will likely still leave a door open to future complaints from Washington.

Conspicuously, this analysis does not take into account two crucial elements: the will of the autonomous government and people of Greenland, which have hitherto rejected any prospect of US control, and the presence of vast deposits of strategic natural resources and rare earths on the island. This second element especially may indeed be of central importance to the US Administration’s posturing over Greenland. The US’ leading Allies in Europe have no choice but to try and convey the message that Trump’s security concerns are in fact taken seriously and that cooperation will yield greater results than unilateral takeovers. Whether genuine or instrumental to a negotiation strategy, Trump’s rhetoric on this and other transatlantic issues has already started chipping away at NATO’s very foundations, which are built on mutual interest, trust, and restrained leadership by the US.

A final decision for the troubled FCAS programme?

Allow me to write about European sixth generation combat aircraft for the third Digest in a row. We did a deep dive in November going over FCAS (the Franco-German-Spanish programme) and its seemingly endless death spiral. It appears that the situation has become unsustainable for France and Germany, which will take a decision — at the political level — on its future on 17 December, as reported by Politico.eu.

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FCAS began formally in 2017 after a political agreement involving Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel. Neither the German nor the French industrial stakeholders ever seemed particularly enthusiastic about the prospect of cooperation on such a sensitive capability.

Germany and France have historically had significantly different approaches do flagship defence industrial programmes, with Paris traditionally characterised by a blurring of the lines between government and industrial interests — with a strong predisposition toward avoiding or abandoning cooperative programmes when national solutions are considered to be within reach of the French industry. This has been observed time and time again, especially in the combat aircraft sector. Germany, meanwhile, generally defends a dynamic where the MoD is very much a customer and defence firms a supplier — with a much clearer separation between government and industry.

Differences abound also regarding export practices, with France taking a much more open approach to selling its defence products around the world. Indeed, export considerations were among the chief reasons why Paris hardly ever found a good fit with European partners, as they had a tangible correlation with operational requirements.

Finally, what began as a political, top-down decision will seemingly be resolved at the political level on 17 December. Politico.eu reports that people familiar with the matter have suggested FCAS may continue more as a high-level cooperative framework, with cooperation only on a number of key technologies but with the final platforms designed and produced separately. Whatever the outcome of this latest attempt to mend the relationship, it is unlikely FCAS will continue in its current configuration, as the current state of affairs seems to satisfy neither the French nor the German defence firms involved.

For more:

Germany, France set date for troubled fighter jet project decision - Politico.eu

Poland selects Swedish submarines for its navies

Poland has made its choice regarding the future of its long-neglected submarine fleet. As described in Eurodefence Digest #3, Polish defense officials were examining six proposals from France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and South Korea. As of late October, the German, Italian, and Swedish proposals seemed to be frontrunners. The final decision has rewarded Sweden’s Saab, who is expected to supply Warsaw with three A26 submarines — with first delivery in 2030.

An important point of evaluation for the Polish MoD was whether the winning bid would benefit the national defence industry with commensurate industrial and knowledge transfer. Saab will therefore work closely with Polish group PGZ in order to deliver the submarines to the Navy.

The fragmentation of the European submarine market continues, with multiple offers across the continent and relatively limited demand outside of the largest navies — each one already served by its own national champion. Global markets will become increasingly important as countries seek to make their national programmes more sustainable by securing foreign bids.

For more:

Poland picks Sweden’s Saab to supply it with three submarines - Reuters

Sweden and Saab selected for Poland’s new submarines - NavalNews

Romania closing in on Turkish warships

Turkey’s rise as a defence industrial power is most often linked to its world-leading aerial drone offerings, yet Ankara has been able to bolster its shipbuilding industry with very large acquisition programmes. In January 2025, the Turkish MoD had revealed that Turkish shipyards were building 31 military ships simultaneously — including a destroyer, a Turkish-designed submarine, and a drone carrier/amphibious assault ship.

As the Turkish navy continues its ambitious overhaul to replace outdated units, its shipbuilding industry will increasingly look to the export market, where it can offer very competitive prices, also due to low labour costs compared to Western European competitors.

Romania’s purchase (through a government-to-government deal) only concerns a single Hisar-class offshore patrol vessel (OPV), a smaller type of naval ship, yet it would represent a much needed addition to a navy dealing with a number of ageing units and procurement delays.

For more:

Romania to boost its Black Sea fleet with Turkish-made patrol ship - NavalNews

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Last Week’s Defence News from Europe

NATO AWACS sill in purgatory

NATO’s AWACS force had been on life support for years when, in July 2025, the US cancelled its E-7 Wedgetail programme, which was slated to replace NATO’s own E-3A AWACS. The Alliance’s Boeing E-3A AWACS (Airborne WArning and Control System) component officially consists of 14 operational aircraft, though the machines that are ready to fly at any given time are fewer. These aging aircraft are used daily to monitor NATO airspace (and beyond) in order to detect low- or high-flying threats. They can also provide command and control (C2) to combat aircraft during operations. Their radar’s range, combined with the fact that the E-A3 operate at an altitude of 10km, means that NATO can detect threats well within enemy territory by remaining in NATO’s air space.

Since the 1980s, the whole endeavour has been rather unique, in that it is one of the few instances where NATO has directly procured major platforms instead of relying on allied-owned ones. Instead, NATO’s AWACS are owned by the Alliance and are operated by member states’ personnel assigned in rotation to the Geilenkirchen air base, on the German side of the Netherlands-Germany border. The surviving planes are in dire need of replacement and are fast approaching their end-of-life, which is planned for 2035.

NATO had announced three years ago that eight of the countries contributing to the AWACS programme were considering the purchase of modern Boeing E-7 planes. Yet, the US Air Force’s cancellation of its national E-7 procurement in order to shift funding to other solutions, and Washington’s withdrawal from the NATO E-3A replacement programme, could put NATO AWACS’ survival in jeopardy. Allies often follow the US’ lead when it comes to updating requirements, although it seems clear that the remaining partners currently intend to go ahead with the replacement process, even if the Americans are looking to focus on space-based alternatives with a global coverage. NATO-owned AWACS still represent an effective and much-appreciated cost-sharing solution to a capability that is still seen as essential by many European MoDs. Indeed, the American withdrawal from the programme has pushed the remaining participants to officially move away from the E-7 and look at other alternatives.

While a number of participating Allies own and operate their own aircraft fulfilling the same role, NATO AWACS grant the Alliance a large, completely homogeneous fleet of aircraft that can not only carry out early warning and C2 activities, but also contribute to maritime monitoring when needed, as well as many other tasks.

There are many candidates to taking the E-7’s place, with Saab’s GlobalEye aircraft a possible frontrunner. Although not a one-to-one replacement for the E-7, as its radar is smaller and less capable, the GlobalEye is cheaper to acquire and operate, which would be ideal and more in line with European approaches.

For more:

NATO Cancels Plan to Buy E-7 Wedgetails - Air and Space Forces

Awacs partners seek alternative for fleet replacement - Netherlands MoD

NATO AWACS - adapting to the changed security environment in Europe - KEY.AERO

Flexibility the name of the game in GCAP

The Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) for a sixth generation combat aircraft seems to be settling on a very flexible approach with regard to weapons as well as the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) it will fly with. While the Franco-German-Spanish FCAS has been mired in very public disagreements, while being characterised by a seemingly less flexible cooperative approach, GCAP appears to be moving ahead more nimbly — with all the UK, Italy, and Japan all agreeing on retaining a level of national control over certain key aspects. This is certainly the case for CCAs, with each nation currently investing in separate development efforts. Export pushes are very much on the cards for both FCAS and GCAP in order to make them financially sustainable, and I’ve maintained for a while that CCAs, sold in a package with the core manned platform, may become a decisive selling point in a very competitive future market for sixth generation systems.

In other words, future importers will not just look to acquire the most competitive sixth generation core platform they can afford, but will also evaluate whether it comes with a competitive suite of compatible CCAs.

For more:

GCAP fighter jet designers push to keep weapons, drone options open - DefenseNews

The New Partnership among Italy, Japan and the UK on the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) - IAI

New details on the new Italian-Turkish drone partnership

There was a lot of surprise throughout Europe earlier this year when Italy’s Leonardo and Turkey’s Baykar announced a joint venture to tackle the international drone market. LBA Systems, the offspring of this new partnership, is positioning itself to become a leading player in the aerial drone market in Europe and, according to Leonardo’s CEO, globally. As reported by the Aviationist, LBA Systems has identified three locations in Italy to build the Turkish-designed aircraft: the TB2 and the Akinci will be assembled in Villanova d’Albenga; the Kizilelma CCA in Grottaglie; and the TB3 in Ronchi dei Legionari.

The core strategy for the joint venture has been from the start to combine Baykar’s proven track record in developing and producing capable and cost-effective aerial drones with Leonardo’s expertise in payloads, sensors and sensor fusion, mission systems, electronics, and certifications in Europe.

The joint venture, as well as Baykar’s acquisition of the long-struggling Piaggio Aerospace, have attracted much interest around Europe. The creation of LBA Systems points to an increasingly clear-cut attempt by the Italian defence establishment to expand its horizons and seek new opportunities away from EU partners when considered advantageous or necessary (see GCAP).

A particularly interesting aspect of the whole operation is the Kizilelma, which may have the potential to become the Italian CCA option for GCAP. In fact, given limited Italian investment in combat drone technology in recent years, Leonardo could conceivably recover much of the lost ground by adding its systems to the close-to-market Turkish design.

For more:

LBA Systems to Build TB2, TB3, Akinci and Kizilelma UCAVs in Italy - The Aviationist

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Last Week’s Defence News from Europe

FCAS’ Slow Death Spiral and Defence Industrial Cooperation with France

(Full article here).

The Future Combat Air System (FCAS), a joint sixth-generation fighter programme involving France, Germany, and Spain, is faltering due to persistent disagreements, highlighted by the latest public spat between the Airbus and Dassault CEOs.

As I wrote in my latest standalone article on this website, the longstanding conflict stems in part from France’s dominant defense industry (DTIB) and its historical tendency — often led by Dassault — to demand a lion’s share of the work and decision-making authority in cooperative combat aircraft programmes such as FCAS. This approach more often than not frustrates partners and leads to difficult cooperation, with this programme providing the latest example.

France, Germany, and the respective industrial players are now at an impasse, putting the survival of FCAS in doubt, at least in its current configuration. While German options are limited, the programme’s failure would undermine France’s credibility as a leader in European defense cooperation, underscoring its need to demonstrate a greater capacity for compromise in crucial, large-scale projects — especially in the field of combat aircraft.

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US Moves Some Troops out of Europe

As the US administration reviews its military posture in Europe, NATO allies observe the first signs of a small shift in American focus toward other theatres. In a statement from 29 October, U.S. Army Europe and Africa confirmed that the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team of the 101st Airborne Division will rotate out of Europe but will not be replaced. The same statement declares that:

“this is not an American withdrawal from Europe or a signal of lessened commitment to NATO and Article 5 [but rather] a positive sign of increased European capability and responsibility.”

This is by all accounts a small drawdown, consisting of roughly 700 soldiers who were hitherto deployed to Poland, Romania, and Germany out of the over 80.000 normally present in Europe. Yet it could be just the beginning of a more significant re-structuring — one that has been signalled since the start of President Trump’s second term. While the Indo-Pacific has long been associated with shifting American deployments, the Pentagon has been rather occupied with a build-up of forces in the Caribbean and an increased military presence on the border with Mexico — to which some elements of the 101st Airborne Division have been dispatched.

Undoubtedly, some European allies — especially Poland and the Baltic states — will be observing carefully the US’ next moves in terms of posture in Europe, as even today NATO’s conventional deterrence relies heavily on the American troops already deployed to the continent.

For more:

The US draws down some troops on NATO’s eastern flank - Task & Purpose

101st Airborne infantry unit leaves Europe as US focuses on border, drug war - DefenseNews

The Romanian Government Wants Fairer Access to EU Defence Funds

Speaking to Politico.eu, Romanian Defense Minister Liviu-Ionuț Moșteanu voiced his concerns that Europe’s so-called rearmament and the EU initiatives to encouraged will mostly benefit larger countries.

Technological and industrial capabilities are unequally distributed in Europe and concentrated in a handful of countries: chiefly France, Germany, and Italy but also Spain and Sweden. As a result, the current push for defence readiness — which has strong industrial undertones — risks benefitting mostly the defence technological and industrial bases (DTIB) of the largest players, leaving others behind. This is one of the great dilemmas regarding EU defence initiatives such as the European Defence Fund (EDF), but also joint procurement programmes such as SAFE.

Countries like Romania will be looking to make sure that future procurement will benefit their own industry as much as possible, both in terms of economic return but also in terms of uplifting their DTIB with new capabilities and know-how. Indeed, as Minister Moșteanu succinctly put it:

“It’s very important for the years to come that when we talk about spending money, we spread [the industrial return] evenly throughout the continent.”

This will not be easy. Larger industrial powers have much bigger companies, backed by decades of large-scale investment and contracts. To be sure, some success has already been achieved in distributing investment. Rheinmetall stands out as a virtuous example, with concrete efforts to open or expand factories in countries around Europe. When it comes to encouraging better access for smaller defence industries to cooperative R&D efforts, such as under EDF, they still encounter stiff competition from a vast array of companies. EDF incentivises the participation of small and medium enterprises (SME), which make up the vast majority of smaller countries’ DTIBs. Yet few of these are as well-integrated with the larger supply chains in Europe, which are essentially controlled by the continent’s prime contractors and therefore often out of reach for SMEs representing less prominent countries.

For more:

Romania wants a piece of Europe’s defense pie - Politico.eu

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Defence industrial cooperation among European powers has never been easy; even less so when it involves France and its firms. To be sure, Paris boasts Europe’s most well-rounded defence technological and industrial base (DTIB) and it has mastered the art of leveraging its numerous comparative advantages in order to secure a leading role in cooperative programmes. Nevertheless, such leveraging has often been seen as excessive by partners as French stakeholders have a history of fighting hard for dominant positions and dragging their feet — or leaving consortia altogether — when they are unable to gain the desired lion’s share of the work. This approach has been cause of much frustration and, in some cases, reluctant admiration among current and past partners throughout Europe.

The field of combat aircraft is a particularly interesting case study in this regard, with a number of telling examples, including the Eurofighter and the defunct predecessor of the Tornado — both having had some form of French involvement at the very start. Marc Devore and Moritz Weiss wrote a detailed account of the behind-the scenes of these programmes, showing just how much control French prime contractors — and especially Dassault — have had historically on the MoD’s decision-making in matters of defence industrial cooperation with partner nations. Indeed, a running joke among insiders is that Dassault and France’s General Armaments Directorate are the same thing.

Trappier’s rhetoric has been quite consistent from the start, strongly rooted in Dassault’s position that it can take the programme forward without any partners, and insisting that it has the right to a dominant decision-making role in order to avoid lengthy discussions over key issues. Unsurprisingly, Airbus Germany, which in the context of FCAS is Germany’s leading prime contractor, is starting to show impatience at Dassault’s aggressive approach.

The survival of FCAS in its current form appears to be increasingly unlikely. However, Berlin may find it has no choice given the few alternatives available to it. The Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) involving Italy, Japan, and the UK is moving ahead much more pragmatically, though not without disagreements. GCAP partners have thus far demonstrated an ability to compromise unseen in FCAS, and adding a major player such as Germany to the mix risks offsetting a fragile balance. Furthermore, any defence industrial cooperation programme is at its core a quest to find the best compromise between cost sharing and industrial/technological returns. Despite the huge projected costs, adding too many players to programmes such as FCAS and GCAP risks making the respective industrial and technological slices cheaper to ‘buy’, but crucially too small to be of real interest to participating firms and countries. Like other governments rumoured to be in GCAP’s orbit, such as Saudi Arabia, Germany would bring much-needed hard cash; unlike Riyadh, however, Berlin and its large defence industry will also bring to the table significant work share demands.

France has long styled itself as the driving force behind European defence integration. FCAS represents an opportunity for Paris to demonstrate its credibility in taking on this role, but also that it is able to constructively take part in flagship cooperative programmes, from start to finish, without trying to frustrate partners into submission. While it is undeniable that Paris’ DTIB is superior to most in many sectors, and that it has been capable of cooperating successfully before — especially with Italy — French practices must better align with the country’s rhetoric on European cooperation. Difficult as it may be for France, and especially Dassault, the country must demonstrate its ability to compromise in the field of combat aircraft, which are arguably the most visible and resource-intensive defence industrial cooperation endeavours.

EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and HRVP Kaya Kallas have presented a new roadmap to strengthen European defence capabilities, only months after the publication of the White Paper for European Defence. The Readiness Roadmap 2030’s ultimate goal is to help Member States achieve a level of defence preparedness sufficient to deter Russian aggression by 2030, by focusing mainly on strengthening the European defence industrial base’s ability to innovate and produce at scale as independently as possible.

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The document a step toward better defining the EU’s role in the European continent’s defence, but some of the language stands out as ambiguous with regard to some key points. For instance, among the initial European Readiness Flagships named by the document, the European Drone Defence Initiative and the European Air Shield seem to significantly overlap with the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence.

The Roadmap also identifies nine “initial Priority Capability Areas” that are considered crucial toward defence readiness by 2030, and encourages Member States to form Capability Coalitions in order to identify and address shortfalls in each area cooperatively. However, a cursory look at the nine areas reveals some contrast between well-defined capabilities, such as ‘air & missile defence’ or ‘artillery systems’ and much more vague ones, such as ‘maritime’ or ‘ground combat’. As ever in European defence cooperation, any successful effort on this front will depend on the Member States and their industries’ ability to build successful cooperation in an environment usually characterised by competition.

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Last Week’s Defence News from Europe

It’s crunch time for Poland to pick a new submarine design

By Jaroslaw Adamowski for DefenseNews

Poland is facing a year-end deadline from Prime Minister Donald Tusk to select a winning bid for its urgent Orka submarine programme. The Polish Navy currently operates a single Soviet-designed submarine, making the acquisition of new, cruise missile-equipped subs a priority for its navy.

Defense officials are examining six proposals from France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and South Korea. Currently, the German, Italian, and Swedish proposals seem to be the MoD’s favourites. While bids from Germany, Italy, and Sweden were initially scored highest, all six remain in contention for an order of three or four subs. The selected foreign supplier will have to collaborate with Poland’s state-run defense group, PGZ, and its naval shipyard.

The military submarine market is in bustling across the globe, with Europe boasting a wealth of leading industrial players. Indeed, amid efforts to consolidate defence industrial supply and demand at the European level, the submarine field is undergoing considerable fragmentation. Spain, previously dependent on French designs, recently opted for a national alternative with a view to the export market. Italy and Germany, who successfully cooperated in the design of the U212, have parted ways and are pursuing separate paths — again with export opportunities high on the agenda. Sweden’s A26 programme has been plagued by delays and likely depends on success on the export market for achieving sustainability, with only two boats ordered by the Swedish Navy so far.

It looks like Poland will be the first proving ground in a new era of European submarine technology competition.

Netherlands joins US for drone wingmen development

By Michael Marrow and Tim Martin for Breaking Defense

The Netherlands has become the first European country to join the US’ Air Force’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) programme. According to the Dutch State Secretary for Defence Gijs Tuinman, the letter of intent (LoI) signed with the US grants the Netherlands “total access on all levels”. While it’s early to say what ‘total access’ means in practice for the Dutch Air Force and industry, this agreement comes as European countries scramble to find solutions to the CCA problem in a market that appears increasingly fragmented.

France has already invested much in this capability on the back of the successful nEUROn demonstrator, and is already developing a loyal wingman drone for the Rafale fighter. Airbus Germany, teaming up with US defence firm Kratos, has been pitching the XQ-58 Valkyrie to the German Air Force. Meanwhile, Rheinmetall has signed a partnership with Anduril for a European variant of the YFQ-44 Fury. Following the formation of a new joint venture (LBA Systems) between Italian defence industrial giant Leonardo and Turkish drone champion Baykar , the Italian firm’s CEO has mentioned the Kızılelma prototype as a potential base for loyal wingman option for the Italian GCAPs.

As manned combat aircraft become more expensive, complex, and scarce, loyal wingmen are set to become a fundamental component of air forces as a flexible solution to the problem of mass. As such, a cacophony of countries, air forces, and industries will cooperate and compete as they vie for market shares in a growing market.

In the Spotlight: Recent Analysis on European Defence

Not Great, Not Terrible: The Uncertain Future of the Transatlantic Partnership (September 2025)

By Ionela Ciolan in ‘The State of the Transatlantic Alliance’ (edited by Shairee Malhotra)

The transatlantic partnership is currently under unprecedented strain due, primarily, to the second Trump administration’s transactional foreign policy, the continuing US pivot toward the Indo-Pacific, and a global shift to multipolarity. This has created doubts about Washington’s commitment to NATO, the nuclear umbrella, and sustained support for Ukraine, fuelled by fears that the US might negotiate an end to the war without Kyiv’s consent.

Ionela Ciolan writes that Europe’s strategy has been mainly based on appeasement and damage control, leading to concessions such as agreeing to raise the NATO defense and security spending target to 5% of GDP by 2035. The alliance’s future hinges on four critical challenges: ambiguity over US security commitments; giving substance to NATO’s European pillar; the EU becoming a credible security provider; and ensuring any resolution to the war in Ukraine does not put the White House’s short-term objectives over Ukrainian sovereignty.

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Given some of the wording, it is difficult not to read the document as a first, not-so-timid step toward an EU that depends less on NATO for its defence and security, even though the habitual caveats are clearly spelled out, for instance on the transatlantic alliance remaining “an indispensable pillar of the security of the EU”. Yet, among the initial European Readiness Flagships named by the Roadmap, the European Drone Defence Initiative and the European Air Shield stand out as largely overlapping with the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence. Whereas the White Paper had a distinctly industrial character, these Flagships are instead aiming at building not just technologies, but new military instruments for collective defence. For instance, the Air Shield is described as an: “integrated, multi-layered air and missile defence shield, including necessary sensors, that protects against the full spectrum of air threats”. Although the Roadmap does envisage this and the other Flagships to be fully interoperable with NATO’s command and control systems, questions remain over which EU command and control systems would in fact manage these future instruments, given that nothing of the sort exists today. Indeed, creating new ones from scratch — along with permanent military command structures — would on the one hand somewhat alleviate EU Member States’ dependency from NATO and the US, but on the other create the type of duplication the document itself wants to avoid.

The Roadmap identifies nine “initial priority capability areas” that are considered crucial toward defence readiness by 2030, and encourages Member States to form Capability Coalitions in order to identify and address shortfalls in each area cooperatively.

A cursory look at the nine areas reveals some contrast between well-defined capabilities, such as ‘air & missile defence’ or ‘artillery systems’ and much more vague ones, such as ‘maritime’ or ‘ground combat’. As ever in European defence cooperation, any successful effort on this front will depend on the Member States and their industries’ ability to build successful cooperation in an environment usually characterised by competition. For instance, while efforts on missile technologies face a potentially smoother road thanks to the existence of the MBDA multinational group, the air defence sector remains competitive and fragmented — as demonstrated by the absence of France and Italy from the German-led European Sky Shield Initiative, which looked at German, US, and Israeli technology.

The Coalitions are not linked to any funding by default, with the Commission promising to ensure the link to EU funding opportunities, and are described as strictly Member State-led.

Military mobility, another significant priority for the EU, finally gets some much-needed attention after years of neglect. The document announces that a new Military Mobility ‘package’ will be presented in November and will include proposals to “set up a unified regulatory framework to facilitate the transport of equipment, goods and passengers” across Europe. Whether enough funding will be mobilised to make real progress on this file remains to be seen, though the Commission does have an opportunity to bring real added value here.

Much like the White Paper, the Roadmap seems to be part genuine step toward better defining the EU’s role in Europe’s defence, and part narrative exercise taking existing tools and initiatives and attempting to re-order them into a coherent structure.

Asymmetric naval warfare

By Elio Calcagno for The Broadside

NATO’s navies have long enjoyed a degree of technological and numerical superiority compared to their Russian counterpart. Yet, the naval war in Ukraine has demonstrated how even an overwhelmingly superior naval force can succumb to asymmetric tools used competently. In the same vein, the struggle between the Italian Navy and the Royal Navy during WW2’s battle for the Mediterranean has a number of useful lessons for all navies, regardless of their conventional capabilities relative to their foe. In this piece I tried to convey my worry that our planning in the West, and especially Europe, has given for granted that overwhelming conventional superiority is enough to allow our navies to have the initiative against potential adversaries. Therefore, I argue here, asymmetric capabilities are useful even to the most advanced navies.

In the Spotlight: Last Week’s Analysis on European Defence

Smoke and mirrors: Building EU resilience against manipulation through cognitive security

By Beatrice Catena, Ondrej Ditrych, Nad’a Kovalčíková for EUISS

The public’s vulnerability to disinformation, often fanned by foreign actors, has been laid bare during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The authors argue that cognitive security is vital for EU resilience against manipulation, citing Russian psychological operations and the threat of AI-enabled targeted influence campaigns. Cognitive security, which protects human perception and decision-making from external manipulation, should therefore move beyond tracking disinformation (FIMI) to addressing fundamental behavioural vulnerabilities.

The authors write that the EU must adopt a proactive, multi-layered strategy — strategic, operational, and tactical — to integrate cognitive security into its policies and bolster citizens’ ability to resist cognitive threats. A missing key element in this piece, however, is how a number of political parties and media outlets within Europe have greatly benefited from foreign disinformation (especially Russian), for instance by subscribing to pro-Kremlin or anti-Ukrainian narratives and getting substantial traction on social media as a result. Indeed, a 2023 policy brief by , Teresa Coratella, and Silvia Samorè for ECFR presents a compelling case study on how such dynamics plaid a significant role in Italy’s 2022 general election.

Any attempt by the EU to reinforce the bloc’s cognitive security will inevitably run into the uncomfortable truth that a constructive political process leading to a more cognitively-resilient public may be a politically thorny issue. Furthermore, any tools and institutions resulting from such an effort will themselves be subjected to swinging political interests and therefore may backfire under certain conditions.

Last Week’s Defence News from Europe

Drone wall turns a ‘littoral’ corner as EU eyes southern flank

By Charles Cohen for Euractiv

The EU is shifting its “drone wall” focus from solely the Eastern flank to include its southern edges, in response to criticism from some Member States in the region. More broadly, the additional scepticism from France over the very idea of a ‘drone wall’ as currently envisaged in Brussels, and a lack of German support, risk derailing the idea altogether. With regard to southern doubts, Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius noted Mediterranean countries are now on the frontline and have “different needs” for counter-drone capabilities. Whatever the next developments turn out to be, the drone wall may become a significant point of contention involving Member States and the Commission. It may also raise questions over the Commission itself taking such a prominent role in proposing programmes of this magnitude instead of Member States, when its mandate in terms of defence should be limited to industrial concerns.

The DPP recounts the future of defense. Italian military spending analysed by Mazziotti di Celso

By Matteo Mazziotti di Celso for Formiche

Italy’s Multi-year Programmatic Document (DPP) 2025-2027 for defense was finally released. As Italy lacks any national security strategy or similar official documents, the DPP (drafted yearly but with a three-year horizon) is the only regularly-published source of information as to the MoD’s planning in terms of priorities, procurement programmes and ongoing feasibility studies. Most of all, it provides a more detailed account of how the defence budget is being spent. Matteo Mazziotti di Celso offers a first look at the 72-page document, explaining how it fails to offer real detail on how Rome is supposed to have already reached the now-obsolete 2%-of-GDP NATO defence spending goal, as the government has announced in recent weeks.

NATO sees Russian naval presence wane in the Mediterranean

By Elisabeth Gosselin-Malo for DefenseNews

NATO officials report a significant decrease in Russia’s naval presence in the Mediterranean, attributing the shift to readiness problems and a shifting focus toward the Baltic Sea and High North regions. The reduction from a large task force to only a few ships is exacerbated by the loss of the strategic Russian naval facility in Tartus, Syria, which has complicated resupply and repair efforts for vessels operating in the area.

NATO to kick off annual nuclear deterrence exercise with more aircraft

By Rudy Ruitenberg for DefenseNews

NATO is kicking off its annual nuclear deterrence exercise, Steadfast Noon, featuring one of the largest turnouts in recent years with at least 71 aircraft from 14 countries. Centered around the North Sea and the Netherlands’ Volkel Air Base, the routine training aims to ensure the alliance’s nuclear deterrent remains credible and effective. The U.S. is participating with F-35 jets in the dual-capable aircraft role for the first time. NATO emphasised the defensive, non-aggressive nature of the exercise amid heightened global nuclear tension.

Nazi legacy complicates Germany’s efforts to fight Russian drones

By Nette Nöstlinger for Politico.eu

Germany’s ability to defend against drone incursions, possibly orchestrated by the Kremlin, is severely limited by its post-WWII constitution, which restricts the Bundeswehr from taking a domestic security role. While police have the legal right to shoot down drones, they lack the technical capability. Meanwhile, amending the constitution to give the military the legal tools to take on a new role will be challenging due to the ruling coalition’s weak majority.

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Rethinking Europe’s Security Guarantees for Ukraine

By Elio Calcagno

The ongoing debate surrounding security guarantees for Ukraine is rife with complexity and a significant degree of uncertainty. As European nations consider their role as potential security guarantors for Ukraine, it is crucial to dissect what such guarantees truly entail and whether credible guarantees are plausible and sustainable.

Last Week’s Defence News from Europe

Von der Leyen’s ‘drone wall’ plan crashes into EU reality

By Chris Lunday, Laura Kayali and Jacopo Barigazzi for Politico.eu

Ursula von der Leyen’s proposed “drone wall” for the EU’s eastern flank faces significant hurdles despite recent Russian airspace violations. The concept — a network of sensors and interceptors — is supported by Eastern member states. However, Western and Southern countries question its practicality, cost, and scope, fearing a centralisation of defence in Brussels and demanding equal focus on the Southern borders. Funding and technical implementation details remain elusive.

EU rail push to eastern flank still snarled by rules: French general

By Rudy Ruitenberg for DefenseNews

A French general, Brig. Gen. Fabrice Feola, warned that the EU’s push for rapid military mobility to NATO’s eastern flank is hindered by bureaucracy. Obtaining cross-border approval for military convoys still takes “tens of days,” far longer than the five-day target. Obstacles include complex checks on infrastructure like tunnels and a lack of mapped-out, military-ready rail corridors. France is urging the EU to create dedicated corridors and simplify customs documents to ensure quick troop and equipment deployment.

European arms industry growth to beat 10% a year, Redburn forecasts

By Rudy Ruitenberg for DefenseNews

Financial research firm Redburn forecasts that the European defense industry’s revenue from European customers will grow at an annual rate of 10.5% to 11.5% for the next decade. This growth is driven by European countries committing to NATO’s 2035 spending targets, which could triple the industry’s home-continent revenue. The fastest growth is expected in historically underspending countries like Germany and those near the Russian threat, focusing on areas like air defense and land armament.

France Places New Falcon Albatros Maritime Survaillance Aircraft Order

On NavalNews

On September 26, 2025, the French Defense Procurement and Technology Agency (DGA) ordered five more Falcon 2000 Albatros aircraft from Dassault Aviation for the Maritime Surveillance and Intervention Aircraft (AVSIMAR) program. This new order brings the total planned number of aircraft to twelve. Based on the Falcon 2000LXS business jet, the Albatros is equipped with specialized features like a multifunction radar, an optronic turret, and search and rescue kit for maritime security missions.

Royal Navy Re-Armed: Sea Venom Anti-Ship Missile Achieves IOC and Naval Strike Missile is Test Fired

By James Gray on The Aviationist

The Royal Navy achieved Initial Operating Capability (IOC) with the Sea Venom anti-ship missile, allowing its deployment on front-line Wildcat HMA2 helicopters. Each Wildcat carries up to four Sea Venoms, providing precision strike capability against warships up to corvette size. This milestone significantly enhances the UK’s anti-surface lethality. Additionally, the Royal Navy successfully test-fired the heavier, stealthy Naval Strike Missile (NSM), a new ship-borne weapon.

In the Spotlight: Last Week’s Analysis on European Defence

Drones in the Danish Sky: What Security Perspectives? (French)

By Jean-Claude Allard for IRIS

Unidentified drone intrusions over Danish airports and military sites, starting in September 2025, have created hybrid security threats and forced airport closures. The likely goal is political disruption during high-level European meetings hosted by Denmark, rather than a military objective. The incidents, possibly linked to Russia or pro-Ukrainian networks, underscore the urgent need for a coordinated European strategy to counter illegal drone activity in its airspace.

The first, and perhaps most fundamental, problem with security guarantees is that they require that guarantors be able and willing to go to war, potentially for years, if an attack occurs against the country whose security is being guaranteed. Such commitments demand levels of national resolve on a scale many European nations have not contemplated in decades outside of NATO frameworks.

Secondly, the very concept of a security guarantee presumes a baseline level of security to be guaranteed. For Ukraine, this would clearly involve reaching a negotiated settlement with Russia first. However, Moscow seems highly unlikely to accept any deal that includes robust security assurances from Western or European powers.

Currently, the discussion regarding European support to Ukraine often blends sanctions, and military reassurance forces provided by a “coalition of the willing” – led by France and the UK. Yet nations’ contributions remaining unclear. In fact, staunch Ukraine supporters such as Finland and Poland have appeared to rule out providing troops for such an effort, likely prioritising their own immediate defence needs in the face of Russian sabre rattling. Should it come to it, from an outsiders’ perspective, this lack of a unified, comprehensive vision would make any guarantee inherently fragile.

Solid security guarantees, by definition, must be militarily, politically, and economically plausible and sustainable. Should participating countries prove to be unable to sustain this theoretical multinational reassurance force over the long term, any security guarantees based on such a force would be, in essence, meaningless.

From a military point of view, Europe is currently faced with the uncomfortable truth that absent the full backing of the United States, European NATO militaries could hardly sustain a protracted, high-intensity conflict in Eastern Europe without quickly running out of ammunition. Furthermore, European forces are by and large still far from integrating disruptive technologies like drones in their infantry units at scale.

Politically, the ability to forge and maintain a wide, stable “coalition of the willing” across Europe, given shifting national interests and domestic pressures, is highly questionable. Even more so today at a time of great political instability throughout the continent.

Economically, deploying and sustaining a strong ground and air force – one capable of fighting alongside Ukrainians from day one, not merely observing or advising – for more than a few weeks would represent an unprecedented financial burden for many European economies, which few may be able to shoulder without serious domestic backlash.

Even assuming such a force could be sustained, uncertainties abound. Russia might welcome the diversion of even more of Europe’s already-scarce air defence systems and assets to Ukraine, leaving other critical areas exposed. Furthermore, European governments change ever more frequently at a time of increasing polarisation across the political spectrum. While support for Ukraine is currently bipartisan in many countries, this consensus is not immutable and could erode, particularly if the costs escalate.

Another critical ambiguity lies in how a future conflict might begin. Would it be an unmistakable, conventional invasion, or a gradual Russian encroachment employing hybrid tactics and false-flag operations, or indeed exploiting Russian-speaking minorities, in order to sow doubt and divide a potential response? Security guarantees have failed to deter aggression before, as Poland learned in 1939, and the vague nature of the Budapest Memorandum offers a stark reminder to Ukraine itself that commitments can be less than legally binding and little more than empty words.

Indeed, our very understanding of security guarantees in Western Europe is being challenged today. Russia’s violations of airspace and aggressive drone incursions will continue to test the resolve and unity of the Alliance. Effective guarantees, provided that they are designed to deter aggression, demand a united front predicated on a uniform understanding of the threat and how to counter it. Our inability to even agree on how to deal with armed Russian aircraft violating NATO airspace underscores this fundamental disunity.

Even if we imagine a scenario where a peace deal or ceasefire is reached between Ukraine and Russia, and “decent” security guarantees are granted to Kyiv, it is hard to imagine Russia being so brazen as to mount an attack so egregious that all involved governments would be compelled to go to war without second thoughts. Instead, Moscow will probably continue to push boundaries, manipulate our tolerance levels, and wave nuclear threats until a robust response may be perceived by many as a dangerous escalation from the European side. In such a scenario, weak security guarantees may in fact be worse, for Ukraine and Europe, than no guarantees at all, as these could fatally undermine what remains of Kyiv’s independence and Article 5’s credibility.

Should European countries fail to gain solid US commitments and build a united front in the continent for robust security guarantees, a more pragmatic alternative for Ukraine, and indeed for Europe’s broader security, could rest on several pillars:

1. Stronger Foundations: Boosting the European defence industry, updating procurement practices, expanding our armed forces.

2. Timely Support for Ukraine: Ensuring Ukraine receives weapons when they are needed, not months or years later, allowing them to effectively defend their territory and continue to disrupt Russian logistics.

3. Pragmatic Red Lines: Realising that Russia will continue to move the goal posts of tolerance and probe NATO’s defences and resolve. NATO should be clearer in its messaging regarding our own red lines and demonstrate that territorial violations will not be tolerated further.

4. Moral Rearmament: Recognising that weapons alone are insufficient. Only our self-confidence as European countries and collective willingness to defend Europe can alter Putin’s strategic calculus.